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I. Online platforms in view of  the Estatuto da Ordem dos 
Advogados1 and national law
The concept of  online platforms covers a wide range of  activities, including online 
advertising platforms, markets, search engines, social networks and platforms for the 
collaborative economy2. These services present themselves as a tool to improve consumer 
choice, industry competitiveness, and the access to information across borders.3
In the context of  the European Union’s Digital Single Market (hereinafter, 
DSM), whose objectives lie in an increasing digitization of  the economy4 and in the 
improvement of  access to information in the area of  justice,5 online legal platforms 
present themselves as an opportunity to accomplish these objectives.
This possibility is especially relevant given the characteristics of  the Single Market, 
namely the freedom of  movement between Member States with different legal norms.6 
How can a Slovakian citizen moving to Portugal find out which lawyer is best suited for 
his case? Such platforms might make the process of  finding answers to such questions 
easier. 
However, this path is not without its difficulties, since the deeply disruptive nature 
of  the technology in question,7 which has already shaken industries such as the hotel 
business, transport or retail, calling into question its traditional practices, will have to be 
made compatible with the deontological rules of  lawyers, who are not simple commercial 
service providers, but collaborators in the fulfillment of  justice.8
Regarding lawyer services, there are mainly three types of  online platforms:
- Directories, which consist of  a simple list, not pre-selected by the administrator, 
being similar to a phone book. Normally, the lawyers listed in the directory have not 
made any payment to be included, and sometimes this is done without their knowledge.9 
1 Statutes of  the Portuguese Bar Association (henceforth E.O.A.), Portuguese Bar Association 
(Ordem dos Advogados) is henceforth abbreviated as “O.A.”.
2 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the region, Online Platforms and the Digital Single 
Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, Brussels, 25.5.2016, COM(2016) 288 final, 2, available 
at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0288&from=EN.
3 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament.
4 “Beyond the three pillars of  the Digital Single Market Strategy, its objectives are digitization, namely, 
the conversion of  the economy using ICT, removal of  fragmentation, and the advance of  the digital 
economy.”, see Mirela Mărcut, Crystalizing the EU Digital Policy: An Exploration into the Digital 
Single Market (New York: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 53.
5 Council of  the EU, “EU continues developing European e-justice”, available at: https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/06/eu-continues-developing-european-e-justice/. 
6 “The particularities of  legal rules in each Member State are not comparable to other professions; one 
just has to account the differences between the legal systems of  civil law and common law.” See Liberal 
Fernandes, “O Exercício da Profissão de Advogado na União Europeia”, in Para Jorge Leite, Escritos 
Jurídico-Laborais, coord. Liberal Fernandes, Maria Regina Gomes Redinha, João Reis and João Leal 
Amado (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2015) (free translation).
7 “The new wave of  digital companies is based on the logic of  multi-sided markets that disrupt 
traditional offline interactions by reshaping the ways individuals transact” see Orly Lobel, “The Law 
of  the Platform”, Minnesota Law Review (2016), San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 16-212, available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2742380. 
8 Fernando Sousa Magalhães, “Ideias Soltas sobre o Futuro da Advocacia”, in Advocacia – Que fazer? 
(Coimbra: Minerva, 2001).
9 Council of  Bars & Law Societies of  Europe, “CCBE GUIDE on Lawyers’ use of  online legal 
platforms”, available at https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/
DEONTOLOGY/DEON_Guides_recommendations/EN_DEON_20180629_CCBE-Guide-on-
lawyers-use-of-online-legal-platforms.pdf.
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Examples of  such platforms are www.advogados24h.com/lista-advogados or  https://
directorioprofissionaladvogados.pt/cgi-sys/suspendedpage.cgi, the latter of  which has 
been suspended, as can be inferred from its domain.
- Two-sided platforms, where an intermediary selects the lawyers who appear on 
the website, defining the order in which they appear, or referring them to potential 
clients.10 Examples are http://www.zaask.pt or https://www.advogadoo.com. 
Interestingly, the first announces that it helps us to, “find the most efficient low-cost lawyers 
in Porto.”11 In my opinion, such adjectives go beyond a merely informative purpose and 
become propagandistic, and thus prohibited according to Article 94(4)(a) of  the E.O.A.: 
“Illegal acts of  advertising are, namely, the placement of  persuasive, ideological, self-aggrandizing and 
comparative content”.12
- Websites providing legal services, which are provided directly or indirectly, 
not necessarily by lawyers.13 This category includes question and answer websites 
(https://answers.justia.com), legal chatbots (www.donotpay.com) and sites where legal 
documents are automatically drafted (https://lawhelpinteractive.org,14 or the Brazilian 
http://ruiapp.co).15 As far as it is possible to ascertain, this type of  website is not yet a 
reality in Portugal.
One of  the first issues raised by the platforms is the way in which they publicize 
lawyers’ information.
Although the general prohibition of  professional publicity has been overcome,16 
there remains a distinction between publicity and advertising – the former being 
understood as objective and the latter as propagandistic, misleading. A barrier imposed 
for the sake of  the decorum and dignity of  the profession.17
As such, lawyers are allowed to publicize objective information like their area of  
expertise, or the languages they speak, but cannot advertise persuasive, ideological, self-
aggrandizement and comparative content, mention the quality level of  the practice, or 
promise a specific benefit.18
10 Council of  Bars & Law Societies of  Europe, “CCBE GUIDE on Lawyers’ use of  online legal 
platforms”.
11 See https://www.zaask.pt/advogado-low-cost/porto/porto, accessed on 11 of  March 2019.
12 Freely translated from: “São, designadamente, atos ilícitos de publicidade: a) A colocação de 
conteúdos persuasivos, ideológicos, de autoengrandecimento e de comparação”. 
13 Council of  Bars & Law Societies of  Europe, “CCBE GUIDE on Lawyers”.
14 “LawHelp Interactive is a website that helps you fill out legal documents for free. It’s simple: we 
ask you questions and use your answers to complete the documents you need, no lawyer necessary” 
(emphasis added).
15 “Through a conversation with Rui, your complaint will be automatically generated with the 
arguments capable of  supporting your defense in the court”.
16 “Lithuania  and  Portugal  report  substantive  change  in  the  legal  profession  and  both  have 
freed  up  the  effective  prohibition  to  allow  some  ‘publicity’  type  activities  (although proactive 
promotional advertising is still prohibited).”, see Commission of  the European Communities, 
Commission Staff  Working Document, “Progress by Member States in reviewing and eliminating 
restrictions to Competition in the area of  Professional Services”, Brussels, 5th of  September, 
2005, SEC(2005) 1064, Para. 84, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005SC1064&from=EN. 
17 Free translation from “subsiste inalterada a barreira entre a publicidade informativa, pessoal e 
profissional, e a publicidade de tipo comercial ou propagandística, comparativa e tendencialmente 
enganosa, sendo aquela lícita e esta ilícita, barreira essa imposta por exigência do decoro e da 
dignidade da profissão”. Fernando Sousa Magalhães, Estatuto da AO anotado e comentado, 10th 
Edition (Coimbra: Almedina, 2015).  
18 Article 94(4)(a) (b) (d) of  the Lei 145/2015.
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Regarding the medium in which lawyers may advertise, the Code of  Conduct for 
Lawyers in the European Union stipulates that “personal publicity by a lawyer in any form 
of  media such as by press, radio, television, by electronic commercial communications or otherwise is 
permitted to the extent it complies with the requirements of  2.6.1”.19 Therefore, lawyers are free to 
publicize in any medium, as long as the content is compliant with the rules stated above.
Taking into account the distinction between directory and two-sided platform, the 
presentation of  lawyers in the latter may constitute a violation of  deontological rules 
if  the presentation is based on imprecise criteria chosen by the intermediary, such as 
“quality” or, as we have seen in www.zaask.pt, “effectiveness”. Such a problem will not 
arise, in general, in directories, since there is no selection or cataloguing there.
Two-sided platforms raise another problem: if  the intermediary chooses the 
lawyers he is referring according to non-transparent criteria, this could constitute an 
infringement of  the principle of  free choice of  lawyer20 as laid out in Article 1170(1) of  
the Portuguese Civil Code (a contrario). (This issue will be developed later in light of  the 
concept of  client solicitation).
As early as 2007, the General Council of  the Portuguese Bar Association – Conselho 
Geral da Ordem dos Advogados - was asked to give its opinion on the theoretical possibility 
of  an online directory of  lawyers.21
The Council stated that if  the search criteria allowed the consumer to find several 
lawyers of  his choice according to objective, dignified and true information, there’s no 
breach of  deontological rules.22
As we can see, directories do not pose a big challenge to deontological rules.
But in reality, directories do not represent any innovation since they are, in 
practice, mere online phone books. The crux of  the matter is in the two-sided 
platforms.
In 2011, the General Council was asked to give its opinion on a platform aimed 
at, “attracting clients on the Internet” by, “adopting a ´pull` strategy, which aims to attract 
the consumer to its message”.23
On this basis, the GC decided that “bearing in mind that the purpose of  the platform in 
question is to “attract customers” by referring them, what is actually at issue is an act of  soliciting 
customers that undermines the dignity of  the legal profession and therefore lawyers are not allowed 
to voluntarily join the platform”.24
19 Council of  Bars & Law Societies of  Europe, “Charter of  core principles of  the European legal 
profession & Code of  conduct for European lawyers”, page 13, Point 2.6, Para. 2, available at https://
www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/DEONTOLOGY/DEON_
CoC/EN_DEON_CoC.pdf.
20 Council of  Bars & Law Societies of  Europe, “CCBE GUIDE on Lawyers”, 7.
21 Conselho Geral da Ordem dos Advogados, Parecer No. 06/07, November 24th, 2007, available at 
https://portal.oa.pt/advogados/pareceres-da-ordem/conselho-geral/2007/parecer-n%C2%BA-0607/.
22 Free translation from “Na verdade, se por meio dos critérios de pesquisa estabelecidos, o consumidor 
puder encontrar vários Advogados à sua escolha e, de acordo com os elementos disponibilizados, 
puder escolher com base em informação objectiva, digna e verdadeira, como dispõe o artigo 89.º, No. 
1, não poderá nunca ser arguida qualquer desconformidade do serviço em questão com as normas 
deontológicas em vigor”.
23 Conselho Geral da Ordem dos Advogados, Parecer No. 63/PP/2011-G, February 
16th, 2012, available at https://www.oa.pt/cd/Conteudos/Pareceres/detalhe_parecer.
aspx?sidc=32517&idc=1365&idsc=158&ida=124713.
24 Free translation from “tendo em conta que a plataforma informática em questão tem como objectivo 
“atrair clientes”, encaminhando-os, do que se trata, na verdade, é de um acto de angariação de clientela 
que atenta contra a dignidade da profissão de advogado, não podendo, assim, deixar de se considerar 
que está vedada ao advogado a sua inclusão voluntária na referida plataforma”.
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In 2017, the O.A.’s Regional Council of  Coimbra, analyzing the two-sided 
platform Advogadoo, decided that:25
“The registration on the site is aimed precisely at ensuring that the client can reach the 
lawyer through the entity that manages the site, which establishes contact between the parties. In our 
understanding this intermediation does not encourage a fair choice of  lawyer”.26
“Customer acquisition should be carried out, unless better understood, through merit in the 
exercise of  one’s duties and its public recognition, and not through the mere formalization of  a 
budget”.27
The website in question is manifestly contrary to the principle of  the dignity of  the profession, 
whether by infringing the rules on advertising or by making it possible to attract customers through 
an intermediary”.28
The wording of  the decision makes it seem like it was based on the specific 
characteristics of  the platform Advogadoo.
Nevertheless, the following decision generalizes this prohibition to all platforms. 
The O.A.’s Regional Council of  Porto, in Parecer No. 6/PP/2017-P, affirmed 
that the presence of  lawyers on this type of  platforms is a disciplinary offence:29
“The registration of  a lawyer on a platform that promotes contact between lawyers and clients, 
such as the so-called (...), constitutes a disciplinary offence for violation of  the duty not to solicit 
clients.”
“In our opinion, attracting clients through the said platform puts at risk the relationship of  
trust between lawyer and client, since it does not guarantee a free choice on the part of  the client or 
interested party”.30
At the same time, the Commission of  Combat of  Non-authorized Legal 
Practice, of  the O.A.’s Regional Council of  Évora, affirmed that the platform incurs 
in the crime of  non-authorized legal practice.31
As we can see, two-sided platforms are prohibited by the Ordem dos Advogados 
on the basis of  the prohibition of  client solicitation and the crime of  non-authorized legal 
practice. These concepts will be analyzed separately, since the former is related to 
members of  the profession, and the latter to the rest of  the population.
25  Conselho Regional de Coimbra, Parecer No. 7/PP/2017-C, 6 Abril 2017, available at http://www.
oa.pt/cd/Conteudos/Pareceres/detalhe_parecer.aspx?sidc=64621&idc=1365&idsc=116053&ida=152440. 
26 Translated from “A inscrição no sítio visa exactamente que o cliente chegue ao/à Advogado/a pela 
via da entidade gestora do sitio, que possibilita o contacto entre ambos, não se entendendo que aquela 
potencia uma escolha justa do/a Advogado/a”.
27 Free translation from “A angariação de clientela deve ser efectuada, salvo melhor entendimento, 
por via do mérito no exercício das funções e do reconhecimento público do mesmo, e não pela mera 
formalização de um orçamento”.
28 Free translation from “o sitio da internet em causa colide manifestamente com o princípio da 
dignidade da profissão, quer pela via da violação das regras relativas à publicidade quer pela 
possibilidade de angariação de clientela por interposta entidade”, available at: http://www.oa.pt/cd/
Conteudos/Pareceres/detalhe_parecer.aspx?sidc=31690&idc=76141&idsc=116053&ida=152440.
29 Conselho Regional do Porto, Parecer No. 6/PP/2017-P, 16 February 2017, available at: https://
www.oa.pt/upl/%7B7e01641a-6cce-4f8c-8425-e854b727f0ff%7D.pdf. 
30 Free translation from “A inscrição de advogado em plataforma que promova o contacto entre 
advogados e clientes como a denominada (…), constitui ilícito disciplinar por violação do dever 
de não angariar clientes”. “Na nossa opinião, a angariação de clientela por intermédio da referida 
plataforma põe em risco a relação de confiança entre advogado e cliente, já que não garante a escolha 
livre por parte do mandante ou interessado”.
31 Comissão de Combate à Procuradoria Ilicita do Conselho Distrital de Évora da Ordem dos 
Advogados, Comunicado, 2 February 2015, available at https://www.oa.pt/cd/Conteudos/Artigos/
detalhe_artigo.aspx?sidc=31923&idc=32006&idsc=40570&ida=139291.
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The prohibition of  client solicitation is stipulated in Article 90(2)(h) of  the E.O.A.:
“It is forbidden to solicit clients, by oneself  or through an intermediary”.32
Regarding this concept, Fernando Sousa de Magalhães states that: “The prohibition 
on soliciting clients referred to in Article 90(2)(h) is closely linked to the principle of  the free choice 
of  lawyer by the client or interested party, since it is understood that such a choice is the only one that 
guarantees the necessary relationship of  trust between the lawyer and his client, as radically imposed 
by Article 97(1). The principle of  free choice, now enshrined in Articles 67(2) and 98(1) of  the 
E.O.A., thus remains untouched”33 (emphasis added).
Orlando Guedes da Costa states: “It is the dignity and decorum of  the profession that 
require that lawyers do not solicit clientele by themselves or others”. 
“Soliciting clients by a lawyer or through an intermediary would violate another duty of  the 
lawyer towards the community”34 the author referring here to the free choice of  lawyer.
It emerges from the above that the concept of  “soliciting clients” is associated 
with the principles of  dignity or of  free choice of  the lawyer. However, in order 
to verify whether two-sided platforms solicit clients, we will have to analyze this 
concept further.
In my opinion, the concept of  “client solicitation” contemplates the offering of  
legal services when not requested, and without any context justifying it.
This act is considered a breach of  the principle of  free choice of  lawyer, since 
it is an enticement, a persuasion, which aims to limit the contractual freedom35 of  
the client, by influencing his decision making process, or by limiting the subjects with 
whom he can contract.
The connection of  this concept with the principle of  dignity of  the Lawyer is 
obvious, as it constitutes a malicious practice, not compatible with the special ethical 
requirements inherent to the profession.
Therefore, if  the online platform engages in practices such as invasive 
advertising through unsolicited communications,36 or “pull marketing” techniques, 
lawyers on the platform will be engaging in the practice of  soliciting clients through 
an intermediary and, consequently, will be liable to disciplinary action.
However, if  the platform is only referring clients who access its website by their 
own volition, the presence of  lawyers on the platform cannot be prohibited on the 
basis of  “client solicitation”, since the contractual freedom of  clients is not being 
limited. This indiscriminate ban on intermediation platforms deprives consumers of  
the benefits of  these new technologies – such as the ability to discover a wider range 
32 Translated from: “Não solicitar clientes, por si ou por interposta pessoa”.
33 Fernando Sousa Magalhães, Estatuto da Ordem dos Advogados, anotado e comentado, 11th 
Edition (Coimbra: Almedina, 2017), 132 and 133.  
34 Orlando Guedes da Costa, Direito Profissional do Advogado, 8th Edition (Coimbra: Almedina, 
2015), 331 and 332.
35 “Freedom to conclude contracts shall consist in the freedom to conclude contracts or to refuse 
to conclude them”, See Mota Pinto, Teoria Geral do Direito Civil, 4th Edition, (Coimbra: Coimbra 
Editora, 2005); “The doctrine that people have the right to bind themselves legally; a judicial concept 
that contracts are based on mutual agreement and free choice, and thus should not be hampered by 
external control” (emphasis added). See Bryan A. Garner, Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th. (St. Paul, MN: 
West Pub., 2000), 735.
36 “The use of  automated calling systems without human intervention (automatic calling machines), 
facsimile machines (fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of  direct marketing”. See Article 13 of  
Directive 2002/58/EC.
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of  legal practitioners, and of  comparing them according to location and expertise37 
– which actually increase clients’ contractual freedom.
Now, since these platforms also provide legal advice and draft contracts, they 
would be considered, in light of  Portuguese Law, as incurring in the crime of  non-
authorized legal practice. 
As stipulated in Lei 49/2004, only graduates in law with registration in force in 
the Portuguese Bar Association and solicitors registered in the Chamber of  Solicitors 
may practice the acts of  lawyers and solicitors.38
The scope of  reserved legal activities in Portugal is quite wide, covering the 
judicial mandate but also legal advice,39 the drafting of  contracts40 and the practice 
of  preparatory acts aimed at the constitution, alteration or extinction of  legal acts.41
The non-authorized practice of  these acts is classified as a crime, with a prison 
sentence of  up to 1 year or a fine of  up to 120 days.42
Besides prohibiting the practice to non-qualified individuals, this provision also 
forbids its execution when done in conjunction with lawyers, in a collective manner.
As stated in Article 6 of  Lei 49/2004, only legal persons that are, “composed 
exclusively of  lawyers, solicitors or lawyers and solicitors” or law firms, are allowed to practice 
acts reserved to lawyers and solicitors. 
As such, under Portuguese law, if  legal platforms provide legal advice and are 
not “composed exclusively of  lawyers, solicitors or lawyers and solicitors”,43 or part of  a law 
firm,44 their practice will be considered a crime.
In October 2016, the OECD and the Portuguese Competition Authority – 
Autoridade da Concorrência – carried out an analysis of  Portuguese rules and regulations 
that could have a negative effect on the functioning of  markets, namely the norms of  
self-regulated professions such as lawyers and solicitors.45
In said analysis, the monopoly on legal activities stipulated in Lei 49/2004 was 
found as possibly leading, “to higher prices for those services and less diversity and innovation”,46 
a prohibition which may not be necessary to ensure consumer protection.47 Thus, its 
revision was advised.48
In the opinion of  OECD, “opening up reserved activities to additional qualified 
professions could generate substantial consumer benefits, in the form of  innovative and more diverse 
services at lower prices”.49
37 See De Autoriteit Consument & Markt, “Gedragsregels advocaten mogen opkomst online platforms 
advocaten niet belemmeren” Free translation: Lawyers’ rules of  conduct lawyers should not impede 
the attendance of  online platforms, 13 of  December 2018, available at https://www.acm.nl/nl/
publicaties/gedragsregels-advocaten-mogen-opkomst-online-platforms-advocaten-niet-belemmeren.
38 Article 1(1) of  Lei 49/2004, of  23 of  March.
39 Lei 49/2004, Article 1(5)(b).
40 Lei 49/2004, Article 1(6)(a).
41 Lei 49/2004, Article 1 (6)(a).
42 Lei 49/2004, Article 7.
43 Lei 49/2004, Article 6(1).
44 Lei 49/2004, Article 6(1).
45 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Portugal: Competition Assessment 
Project”, Lisbon 6 of  July, 2018, available at: http://www.oecd.org/competition/portugal-
competition-assessment-project.htm.
46 OECD, OECD Competition Assessment Reviews: Portugal: Volume II - Self-Regulated Professions 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018), 204, available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264300606-en.
47 OECD, OECD Competition Assessment Reviews.
48 OECD, OECD Competition Assessment Reviews.
49 OECD, OECD Competition Assessment Reviews.
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Regarding the prohibition of  multidisciplinary law firms stipulated in Article 
6(a), it found that “to rule out multidisciplinary activity in the same professional firm, between 
potentially complementary service providers, harms competition and can be detrimental to consumer 
welfare”;50 “this restriction does not allow for the full exploration of  economies of  scope that come 
with the offer of  different services by a “same service delivery unit” that shares infrastructure and 
human capital. It foregoes gains from specialization and service quality that would result from the 
interaction between a wider range of  professionals”.51
The OECD’s prediction that these norms could constitute an obstacle to 
innovation appears to have been correct. 
Legaltechs such as the German helpcheck.de,52 the French legalife.fr53 and 
captaincontrat.com,54 or the Spanish biglelegal.com55 would all be prohibited under 
Portuguese law, since the company’s shareholders are not all lawyers, and thus would 
incur in the crime of  non-authorized legal practice.
The problem is that for an online platform to be developed in an apt manner, 
it is necessary to have multidisciplinary knowledge, partnerships between IT 
professionals and lawyers. In the case of  captaincontract.com, for example, the 
clients fill out an online form, indicating all the information the lawyer needs. Then, 
the website’s software creates the order, collects the information and transfers it 
directly to the lawyer.56
50 OECD, OECD Competition Assessment Reviews, 207.
51 OECD, OECD Competition Assessment Reviews, 207.
52 “Helpcheck is a unique combination of  lawyers, entrepreneurs and digital experts.” See https://
www.helpcheck.de/ueber-uns (free translation). “Helpcheck was founded in 2016 (…) as a “justice-
as-a-service” platform for consumer rights, providing people with easy access to justice, especially in 
the life insurance sector. Following a free calculation of  each claim based on an extensive algorithm, 
consumers’ claims are brought to court.” See Mary Loritz, “Legal tech startup Helpcheck raises 
€11 million to defend consumer rights against big corporations”, EU-Startups, January 16, 2019, 
https://www.eu-startups.com/2019/01/legal-tech-startup-helpcheck-raises-e11-million-to-defend-
consumer-rights-against-big-corporations/.
53 Whose founders are “Timothée Rambaud, a mining engineer who worked for Wall Street, Pierre 
Aïdan, a lawyer who worked for Harvard and the major New York firms, and Stéphane Le Viet, 
a polytechnician who has already created several start-ups”. See Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, “La lutte 
sans merci des sites de services juridiques”, Le Monde, 1th October, 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/
economie/Article/2015/10/02/la-lutte-sans-merci-des-sites-de-services-juridiques_4781180_3234.
html. (free translation).
54 Founded by non-lawyers, the website allows companies to “choose the type of  document they 
want to obtain. About twenty are available: statutes, shareholders’ agreements, copyright assignment 
contracts, etc. Then, they simply fill out an online form, indicating all the information the lawyer 
needs. Captain Contrat’s own software then creates the order, collects the information and transfers 
it directly to the lawyer. The latter can therefore concentrate on writing the document (...) without 
wasting time.” See Claire Bouleau, “Captain Contrat, la start-up qui facilite les demarches juridiques 
des PME”, Challenges, 5th of  May 2014, https://www.challenges.fr/entreprise/captain-contrat-la-
start-up-qui-simplifie-les-demarches-juridiques-des-pme_140479 (free translation).
55  “We’re a young, growing team of  legal professionals, technology specialists, designers, and startup 
geeks!” See https://www.biglelegal.com/en/about-us/. “Barcelona-based Bigle Legal automatically 
generates legal documents for your business. Founded in 2016, Bigle’s technology allows companies 
to automate the process of  creating, reviewing, sending, signing, and archiving any type of  contract or 
business document. Send your documents into Bigle, and it turns them into easy to use questionnaires 
that clients can fill in in a matter of  minutes, using electronic signatures.” See Mary Loritz, “10 
Spanish startups to look out for in 2019”, EU-Startups, January 7, 2019, https://www.eu-startups.
com/2019/01/10-spanish-startups-to-look-out-for-in-2019/.  
56 Claire Bouleau, “Captain Contrat, la start-up qui facilite les demarches”.
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In consequence of  the OECD’s report, the Autoridade da Concorrência has 
produced a proposal for legislative and regulatory reform for the liberal professions57 
which addresses some of  the concepts raised. This will be analyzed further below.
Now, online platforms may constitute a more transparent form of  intermediation 
than the already allowed websites of  lawyers.
As we have seen, lawyers are allowed to advertise in any form of  media such as by 
press, radio, television, by electronic commercial communications or otherwise.58 As such, online 
advertising through a website is permitted, but this raises the issue of  how these 
websites are accessed by potential clients. 
Although a website has a unique identifier in the form of  a domain (for example 
www.amazon.com or www.google.com), it is usually not sufficiently well known so 
that consumers access the website primarily through typing it in their browser - the 
so called “Direct traffic”59 - because this implies that the website has previously built a 
strong notoriety, or in other words, a strong brand.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of  websites cannot afford to pursue this 
objective.
As stated by the European Commission in its Antitrust decision against Google 
Inc., “building a  strong  brand  entails  the  investment  of   significant  financial  resources over a 
long  period of  time, without any guarantees of  success. (…) For small and mid-sized companies, 
it is virtually impossible to conduct an expensive and time-consuming brand campaign while also 
focusing extensively on providing an excellent quality for users”.60
Consequently, search engines play a major role in the access to websites. Hence 
the importance of  Search Engine Optimization61 in Digital Marketing, as well as the 
establishment by the European Court of  Justice of  the Right to be Forgotten in search 
engines.62 In short, if  a website does not appear in search engine results, it is as if  it 
does not exist. A fate well known by the UK’s company Foundem, the lead complainant 
in the European Commission’s case against Google Search,63 whose website is still 
suspended64 after the end of  a process that resulted in a fine of  2 424 495 000 Euros 
to the American Company.65
57 Autoridade da Concorrência, “Plano de Ação da AdC para a Reforma Legislativa e Regulatória 




58 Council of  Bars & Law Societies of  Europe, “Charter of  core principles of  the European legal”.
59 Direct traffic is defined as URL’s that people either type in directly or reach via their browser 
bookmarks, See Eyal Eldar, “Getting a lot of  Direct traffic? What does it really mean?”, Seperia, July 
25th, 2013, https://www.seperia.com/blog/what-direct-traffic-really-means/.
60 European Commission, “Antitrust Procedure - Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003”, Case AT.39740 
Google Search (Shopping), 27 June, 2017, para. 583, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf. 
61 IMIS CLOUD PROFESSIONAL, “Using RiSE to maximize SEO results”, “the process of  
maximizing the number of  visitors to a particular website by ensuring that the site appears high on the 
list of  results returned by a search engine.”, available at https://help.imis.com/100_200/Features/
RiSE/Site_Builder/Using_RiSE_to_maximize_SEO_results.htm.  
62 Judgment of  the Court (Grand Chamber), 13 May 2014. Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, C-131/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317
63 See http://www.foundem.co.uk/hygiene/AboutUs.jsp. 
64 See http://www.foundem.co.uk/hygiene/Temporary_Announcement_2016.jsp.
65 European Commission, “Antitrust Procedure - Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003”, Article 2.
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The Commission found that Google skewed search results by “positioning and 
displaying more favourably, in its general search results pages, its own comparison shopping service 
compared to competing comparison shopping services”,66 consequently competitors’ websites 
saw a decrease of  traffic of  as much as 90%,67 while Google´s own service increased 
45-fold.68
In addition to this episode, it was recently discovered that the majority of  listings 
for car accident attorneys on Google in the USA are fake,69 since Google’s “local algorithm 
strongly favors listings that have words in their business name that match the searcher’s query“70 – 
whether or not they are real attorneys.
Bearing in mind that the criteria of  these services are not transparent,71 there 
is a real risk of  a restriction of  the clients’ contractual freedom, since these are not 
informed of  the way in which the search engines catalogue, or even omit, results. 
The user who searches for “Porto Lawyer” on Google does not know why Lawyer 
X appears first than Lawyer Y (or why Lawyer Z does not even appear).
There may be an opportunity to provide customers with more trustworthy 
information, while simultaneously increasing the contractual freedom of  clients, if  two-
sided platforms are based on objective and transparent criteria. 
In the words of  Esther Montalvá, Head of  Digital Affairs at the Colegio de Abogados 
de Madrid72, “If  they just join supply and demand, they are a fabulous breakthrough. My opinion 
changes if  one professional or another is placed depending on who pays more”.73
Regarding this issue, it is relevant to mention the proposal by the European 
Commission for a Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business 
users of  online intermediation services.74
By taking into account that “online intermediation services are key enablers of  entrepreneurship, 
trade and innovation, which can also improve consumer welfare”,75 and that “online search engines 
can be important sources of  Internet traffic for undertakings which offer goods or services to consumers 
66 EUR-Lex - 52018XC0112(01). Para. 9, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018XC0112%2801%29.
67 European Commission, “Antitrust Procedure - Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003”, Para. 465.
68 European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance 
as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service”, Press Release, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm.
69 Joy Hawkins, “The majority of  listings for car accident attorneys on Google are fake”, Search 
Engine Land, March 25, 2019, available at: https://searchengineland.com/the-majority-of-listings-
for-car-accident-attorneys-on-google-are-fake-314569. 
70 Joy Hawkins, “The majority of  listings for car accident”.
71 In the case of  Google, these algorithms are kept as trade secrets and not as patents. Consequently, 
these mechanisms do not have to be disclosed to the public or enter the public domain. See Frank 




73 Free translation from: “Si se limitan a unir oferta y demanda, son un avance fabuloso. Mi opinión 
cambia si se asigna un profesional u otro en función de quién pague más”. See Pedro Del Rosal, “La 
‘uberización’ llega al mundo del Derecho”, El País, 6 November 2018, available at https://elpais.com/
economia/2018/11/01/actualidad/1541090769_034925.html.  
74 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of  online intermediation services”, 
COM(2018) 238 final 2018/0112(COD), Brussels, 26.4.2018, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018PC0238.
75 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of  the European”, Recital 1.
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through websites”,76 this proposal aims to increase the transparency of  these services. 
As such, ”providers of  online intermediation services should therefore outline the main parameters 
determining ranking beforehand, in order to improve predictability for business users, to allow them to 
better understand the functioning of  the ranking mechanism and to enable them to compare the ranking 
practices of  various providers.” While “providers of  online search engines should therefore provide a 
description of  the main parameters determining the ranking of  all indexed websites”.77
While this Regulation – which is still in discussion – has the potential to solve 
some of  the issues raised above, lawyers’ platforms raise specific problems, which need 
to be addressed by the respective Bar Associations.
Indeed, the lawyer-client relationship is characterized by a profound asymmetry 
of  information, since practitioners are required to display a high level of  technical 
knowledge which clients may not have.78 As such, the client is not able to discern ex ante 
the competency of  a practitioner. 
Traditionally, this feature has been seen as one of  the reasons for regulation of  
legal services,79 since the Bar Association does what the individual client cannot: assess 
quality and signal it to potential consumers.80
As such, it can be argued that online legal platforms should also be regulated by 
these professional associations.
One of  the ways in which this intervention can be made is through the 
implementation of  codes of  conduct, which would indicate to the public that certain 
sites have a minimum of  seriousness and guarantees81 – a project that is being 
implemented by the Spanish Bar Association.82 
In fact, since online legal counselling can be considered as an Information Society 
service,83 one has to consider the Directive 2000/31/EC (‘Directive on electronic 
commerce’) which recommends the usage of  codes of  conduct to safeguard “the 
independence, dignity and honour of  the profession, professional secrecy and fairness towards clients and 
other members of  the profession”.84
76 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of  the European”, Recital 3.
77 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of  the European”, Recital 18.
78 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of  the Regions - 
Professional Services - Scope for more reform”, COM/2005/0405 final, 05/09/2005, para. 11. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0405. 
79 “Put succinctly, the public interest justification for self-regulation in a particular context is based on 
three conditions being fulfilled: first, that the activity is afflicted by some form of  market failure, notably 
externalities or information asymmetries”. See Anthony Ogus, “Rethinking Self-Regulation”, Oxford 
Journal of  Legal Studies, Volume 15, Issue 1 (Spring, 1995): 97, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/15.1.97.
80 Frank H. Stephen, James H. Love and Neil Rickman, “Regulation of  the Legal Profession”, in 
Regulation and Economics (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), https://EconPapers.
repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:12771_15.
81 As indicated by Louis Degos, Chairman of  the Foresight and Innovation Commission of  the 
CNB. See Agefiactifs, “Prestations juridiques en ligne, la réponse du Conseil national des barreaux”, 
3 November, 2016, https://www.agefiactifs.com/droit-et-fiscalite/Article/prestations-juridiques-en-
ligne-la-reponse-du-75103.
82 “el CGAE trabaja en ese sentido. «Estamos trabajando en un código de conducta y, quien se adhiera, 
contará con un sello de cumplimiento que aportará confianza en sus servicios»”, cited in Pedro Del 
Rosal, “La ‘uberización’ llega al mundo del Derecho”.
83 Directive 2000/31/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000. Recital 18 
(a contrario) “activities which by their very nature cannot be carried out at a distance and by electronic 
means, such as the statutory auditing of  company accounts or medical advice requiring the physical 
examination of  a patient are not information society services”.
84 Directive 2000/31/EC, Article 8 (1).
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Via the implementation of  codes of  conduct, Bar Associations can make 
sure that while consumers are getting more information, the data they receive is 
trustworthy and is published in compliance with deontological rules.
Private entities can also do their part. In 2017, the “Charte Ethique pour un marché 
du droit en ligne et ses acteurs”85 was signed, an agreement between legaltechs, law firms, 
legal publishers and digital notaries, through which these entities can demonstrate 
their compliance with the law and deontological rules. Some of  the rules to be 
observed are: 
1) the platform must disclose the use of  algorithms, explaining their function86 - 
which is important to ensure transparency and the principle of  the free choice of  lawyer, 
in the context of  bilateral platforms; 
2) the platform is obliged to take out professional civil liability insurance87 - in 
order to safeguard against the risk inherent in platforms that provide legal services.
II. Ordem dos Advogados’ prohibition of  online platforms of  
lawyers in light of  European competition law
Article 101 of  TFEU stipulates that, “the following shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the Internal Market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of  undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of  competition within the internal market”.
Lawyers exercise a liberal profession, since their activity is of  an intellectual nature 
and its practice requires authorization and compliance with certain conditions. 
However, this characteristic does not exclude lawyers and the corresponding 
professional associations from compliance with European competition laws.
As ruled in the Case C-35/96 - Commission v Italy,88 the CJEU affirms that liberal 
practitioners are considered “undertakings”, since, “the concept of  an undertaking covers any 
entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of  its legal status and the way in which it is financed”89 
and that “any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an economic 
activity”.90
Simultaneously, the Court ruled that the public law status of  a professional 
association does not exclude it from being considered an “association of  undertakings”.91
85 See https://www.charteethique.legal.
86 See https://www.charteethique.legal/englishversion: “The Signatories undertake to provide all 
non-confidential information which would allow the beneficiary of  the service to understand its 
essential components, and notably whether it is performed personally by the actor, or by a third party 
subcontractor, in part or in full, or if  it integrates the use of  an algorithm.” “In the latter case, they 
shall explain the role of  such algorithm, and provide the relevant information required to understand 
the results of  the processing by this latter”.  
87 See https://www.charteethique.legal/englishversion: “The Signatories undertake to subscribe 
to professional civil liability insurance adapted to their activities in order to guarantee against, and 
compensate for, damages which their activities may cause, both in respect of  technical services and 
consultancy services”. 
88 Judgment of  the Court (Fifth Chamber) of  18 June 1998, Commission of  the European Communities 
v Italian Republic, Case C-35/96. ECLI:EU:C:1998:303.
89 Case C-35/96, para. 36 to 38. 
90 Case C-35/96.  
91 “The public law status of  a national body such as the CNSD does not preclude the application 
of  Article 85 of  the Treaty.” See Case C-35/96, para. 40; and also Judgment of  the Court of  12 
September 2000, Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, Joined 
cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428, para. 85, “Suffice it to say in this regard that 
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Therefore, the public law status92 of  the Ordem dos Advogados is considered irrelevant.
According to the Court’s case law, professional associations are only exempt from 
complying with competition rules if:93
a) Its governing bodies are constituted by “experts who are independent of  the 
economic operators concerned”,94 or by “representatives of  the public authorities”95 - 
the personal requisite;
And
b) if  they are required under the law to take into account not only the interests 
of  the undertakings they regulate, but also the public interest and the interests of  
undertakings in other sectors or users of  the services in question96 and if  the State 
“retains its power to adopt decisions in the last resort”97 – the legal requisite.
In the case of  the Ordem dos Advogados, the fulfillment of  these requirements is 
immediately precluded, since the Portuguese Constitution – Constituição da República 
Portuguesa – defines public associations as belonging to the “autonomous state 
administration”.98
Consequently, the governing bodies of  these institutions are democratically formed 
from its own members,99 without the presence of  public officials. 
In the case of  the Portuguese Bar Association, its governing bodies are constituted 
exclusively by members of  the profession – as stipulated in Article 11 of  the E.O.A., 
“Only lawyers with registration in force and in full exercise of  their rights may be elected or appointed 
to anybody of  the Order.”
This means that besides the absence of  public officials, the governing bodies of  
the O.A. cannot be considered as comprised of  “independent experts”. In these cases, it 
can be presumed that governing bodies take greater account of  the interests of  the 
profession, than the public interest.100
the fact that a professional organisation is governed by a public-law statute does not preclude the 
application of  Article 85 of  the Treaty”.
92 Article 1(2) of  the Estatuto da Ordem dos Advogados, Lei No. 145/2015.
93 See Sérvulo Correia, “Autoridade da Concorrência e Ordens Profissionais”, Boletim da Ordem 
dos Advogados, No. 43 (2006): para. 3, https://www.servulo.com/pt/investigacao-e-conhecimento/
Autoridade-da-Concorrncia-e-Ordens-Profissionais/2102/.
94 Judgment of  the Court of  19 February 2002, Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, 
third parties: Diego Dessi, Giovanni Bertolotto and Compagnia Assicuratrice RAS SpA. Case 
C-35/99. ECLI:EU:C:2002:97, para. 37. Also Judgment of  the Court of  17 November 1993. 
Bundesanstalt für den Güterfernverkehr v Gebrüder Reiff  GmbH & Co. KG. Case C-185/91. 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:886. Para. 16 to 20. Also Judgment of  the Court (Second Chamber) of  17 October 
1995. DIP SpA v Comune di Bassano del Grappa, LIDL Italia Srl v Comune di Chioggia and Lingral 
Srl v Comune di Chiogga. Joined cases C-140/94, C-141/94 and C-142/94. ECLI:EU:C:1995:330. 
Para. 18 and 19.
95 Judgment of  the Court (Sixth Chamber) of  5 October 1995, Centro Servizi Spediporto Srl v 
Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo Srl. Case C-96/94. Para. 23 to 25. Also, Judgment of  the Court 
(Second Chamber), 28 February 2013. Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da 
Concorrência. Case C-1/12. ECLI:EU:C:2013:127. Para. 47.
96 Judgment of  the Court of  17 November 1993, Bundesanstalt für den Güterfernverkehr v Gebrüder 
Reiff  GmbH & Co. KG. Case C-185/91. ECLI:EU:C:1993:886. Para. 18 and 24.
97 Judgment Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene 
Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese 
Gemeenschap. Case C-309/99. ECLI:EU:C:2002:98. Para. 68. 
98 Article 199(d) of  Constituição da República Portuguesa. See also Sérvulo Correia, “Autoridade da 
Concorrência”, 3.
99 Article 267(4) of  Constituição da República Portuguesa.
100 AG Jacobs.  Cases C-67/96 etc., Albany/Brentjens’/Drijvende Bokken, [1999], para. 184. 
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Regarding the legal requisite, the “autonomous state administration” is defined 
as “the set of  administrative entities that not only differ from the State in that they have their own 
legal characterization, being distinct legal entities, but also in so far as they carry out, in the powers 
in which they are invested, the pursuit of purposes that are freely established and interpreted 
from the corresponding substrates.”101 (my emphasis).
The O.A. freely pursuits the purposes to which it was constituted, with the State 
not controlling the merit of  the decisions, enforcing only a legal control. 
In addition, while the statutes and national law regarding professional 
associations may mention the public interest,102 this general reference is not sufficient 
to fulfill this legal requisite, since “the Court requires national legislation to foresee procedural 
arrangements and substantive requirements capable of  ensuring, with reasonable probability, that 
a self-regulatory body conducts itself  like an arm of  the State working in the public interest”103 
which does not seem to be the case, since, as said, professional associations are only 
controlled as to the legality of  their acts.104 
Only in extreme cases can the public interest demand the expropriation of  
statutory autonomy, with the State replacing the association in its ability to prepare 
and approve its statutes.105
Bearing this in mind, this legal requisite does not seem to be fulfilled; therefore, 
the Ordem dos Advogados is considered an “association of  undertakings”, for the 
purpose of  Article 101.
This norm is drafted to include associations of  undertakings to cover conduct 
that may have similar effects on competition, even if  it does not originate from direct 
collusion between a multitude of  undertakings.106
Besides, the Court has affirmed that, “it cannot be accepted that rules which organise 
the exercise of  a profession fall as a matter of  principle outside the scope of  Article 81(1) EC 
(now 101[1] TFEU) merely because they are classified as “rules of  professional conduct» by the 
competent bodies”.107 
101 Free translation from “a Administração Autónoma do Estado: o conjunto das entidades 
administrativas que não apenas se distinguem do Estado por ostentarem uma caracterização jurídica 
própria, sendo pessoas colectivas distintas, mas também na medida em que levam a cabo, nos poderes 
em que ficam investidas, a prossecução de fins que são estabelecidos e interpretados livremente 
a partir dos correspondentes substratos.”, in Jorge Bacelar Gouveia, “As Associações Públicas 
Profissionais no Direito Português”, Lisbon, 16 October 2000, https://portal.oa.pt/media/117223/
jbg_ma_14420.pdf.
102 Article 3(a)(b)(h)(i) of  the Estatuto da Ordem dos Advogados, Lei No. 145/2015; and Article 2, 
3(1)(a) of  Lei No. 2/2013, 10 January.
103 Ida E. Wendt, EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions: an Uneasy Relationship? (Netherlands: 
Brill/Nijhoff, 2012), 220.
104 Only the regulations that deal with professional internships, the access to the profession and 
professional specialties are controlled by a member of  government, but are considered authorized if  
there is no decision to the contrary within 90 days – See Article 45(5) of  Lei 2/2013.
105 J.J. Gomes Canotilho and Vital Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, 4th Edition 
(Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2014), 811. Nevertheless, this possibility seems to be limited to the 
statutory autonomy of  the association, while the prohibition of  anti-trust behavior is not limited to 
hard-law, such as statutes and the enforcement of  disciplinary power, but also covers decisions that 
produce a de facto influence on the member undertakings.
106 Wendt, EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions, 185.
107 Judgment of  the Court of  First Instance (Second Chamber) of  28 March 2001. Institute of  
Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office v Commission of  the European 
Communities. Case T-144/99. Para. 64. 
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Thirdly, the question that arises is whether the prohibition imposed by the 
Regional Councils of  the Ordem dos Advogados constitutes a “decision by an association of  
undertakings”, for the purposes of  Article 101 TFEU.
The concept of  a decision is interpreted as “vertical measures that are adopted by a 
collective body (…) to which the members conform”,108 as long as they are “determinative for the 
market conduct of  its member undertakings”.109
Since the defining characteristic of  a decision is its influencing capacity, it 
does not have to be formally binding110 and can manifest itself  in the form of  a 
recommendation.
As stated in the Commission’s Antitrust Case v the Belgian Architects’ Association, 
“According to the case law of  the Court, an act described as a recommendation may be contrary 
to Article 81, whatever its legal status, if  it constitutes the faithful reflection of  a resolve on the 
part of  an association of  undertakings to coordinate the conduct of  its members’ on the market in 
accordance with the terms of  the recommendation”.111
In the case in point, even if  the Opinions of  the Ordem dos Advogados are 
interpreted as being non-binding, they produce a de facto influence on the behavior 
of  the members of  the association, since they are informed that their presence on 
two-sided platforms is a disciplinary offense – giving the OA the power to enforce 
disciplinary action.
Regarding the requirement that this decision “may affect trade between Member 
States”, this criterion is already accomplished if  the practice extends over the whole 
territory of  a Member State, since it reinforces “the partitioning of  markets on a national 
basis, thereby holding up the economic interpenetration which the Treaty is designed to bring about”.112 
Since the Opinions of  the OA influence the conduct of  all of  its registered 
members, whose practice extends beyond the borders the Member State; to clients 
regardless of  whether they are established domestically or in another Member 
State,113 and also to visiting members of  the profession who are registered in another 
Member State,114 it can be considered as affecting interstate trade.
Lastly, does this practice have as an “object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of  competition within the Internal Market”?
Since the Opinion of  the O.A. intends to prohibit its member undertakings 
from participating in two-sided platforms, it seems that its objective is indeed the 
restriction of  its members’ professional practice.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the conduct of  the O.A. produces an 
anti-competitive effect on the Internal Market economy, since two-sided platforms 
would allow clients to easily access information related to potential service providers. 
108 Wendt, EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions, 191.
109 Wendt, EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions, 193.
110 Wendt, EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions, 195.
111 European Commission, “Commission Decision of  24 June 2004 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 81 of  the EC Treaty”, Brussels, 24 June 2004, COMP/38.549, Para. 64. 
112 Judgment of  the Court of  19 February 2002. J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse 
Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: 
Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap. Case C-309/99. Para. 95. See also Wendt, EU 
Competition Law and Liberal Professions, 157.
113 Wendt, EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions, 162. 
114 Council Directive 77/249/EEC of  22 March 1977, Article 4 (4). And Directive 98/5/EC of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council of  16 February 1998, Article 7.
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In addition, bearing in mind the existence of  these kind of  platforms in 
countries such as neighbors Spain, France, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, it 
can also be argued that this prohibition increases the cost and complexity for foreign 
clients who seek professional services from across the border, and thus affects “the 
provision of  services out of  the territory on which the professional is established”.115 
Now, as stated by the European Commission, professional regulation rules 
“must be objectively necessary to attain a clearly articulated and legitimate public interest objective 
and they must be the mechanism least restrictive of  competition to achieve that objective”116 – they 
must pass the so-called “proportionality test” – the effects restrictive of  competition 
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of  the 
profession.117
In the case in point, it can be argued that the Bar Association could have used 
other mechanisms instead of  a total prohibition – such as the regulation of  these 
platforms. 
Since “according to Article 3 of  Regulation 1/2003 national competition authorities 
and courts are obliged to apply the EU competition rules where the jurisdictional criterion for 
their application is fulfilled”,118 and bearing in mind the supremacy of  EU law, if  this 
prohibition were to be challenged before the administrative courts, as permitted by 
Article 6(3) of  the E.O.A., the national courts would have to take these rules into 
consideration.
On the other hand, the national competition authority – the Autoridade da 
Concorrência119 – is also obliged to apply these rules.
Since the introduction of  Lei 19/2012, which mimics European standards,120 
the question of  jurisdiction of  European law is not as relevant.  
However, the above analysis is relevant insofar as it clarifies the meaning of  
the rules now present in national law. In fact, this conduct could even be more easily 
considered a violation of  competition rules under national law, since its parameter 
is the simply part or all of  the “national market”, instead of  the single European 
market.
In sum, a total ban on “the registration of  a lawyer on a platform that promotes contact 
between lawyers and clients”121 as decided in the Opinion the Porto’s Regional Council, seems 
to constitute a decision that excessively restricts the practice of  the profession, and 
thus, could be considered as a breach of  competition law.
At European level, the response of  professional associations to online platforms 
has been very different from that of  the Ordem dos Advogados.
115 Wendt, EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions, 163.
116 European Commission, Report on Competition in Professional Services, COM/2004/0083 final, 
09/02/2004, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52004DC0083. 
117 European Commission, Report on Competition in Professional Services. 
118 Wendt, EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions, 170.
119 Article 5 of  Lei No. 19/2012, 8 of  May.
120 Article 12 of  the mentioned Law states that: “Agreements between undertakings, concerted 
practices between undertakings and decisions by associations of  undertakings which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, distortion or restriction of  competition in all or part of  the national 
market, and in particular those which consist of ”.
121 Conselho Regional do Porto, Parecer No. 6/PP/2017-P, 16 February 2017, available at https://
www.oa.pt/upl/%7B7e01641a-6cce-4f8c-8425-e854b727f0ff%7D.pdf. 
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In France, the Regulation of  the Conseil National des Barreaux122 has been 
amended to include a new title, called Prestations Juridiques En Ligne.
Some of  the rules to be observed are the following: the service provided should 
be personalized to the client;123 the lawyer should seek to know his identity, due, for 
example, to potential conflicts of  interest;124 the lawyer should always be identifiable,125 
it should always be possible to establish a personal and direct relationship with the 
user126 and the lawyer’s payment to the platform should be a fixed amount, not related 
to the client’s fees he receives through the platform.127
But the CNB did not stop here, and in 2016 launched its own directory:128 
avocat.fr, where it is possible to search for lawyers according to their specialization 
and languages spoken.129 
In the UK, the Solicitors Regulation Authority found that the provision of  legal 
services online did not require new rules: deontological duties apply regardless of  
the medium used. The duty of  confidentiality, for example, applies to both an email 
and a letter or conversation.130
In the Netherlands, De Orde van Advocaten has presented a detailed explanation 
of  which rules intermediation platforms have to comply with in order to be allowed 
under the Gedragsregels Advocatuur.131
The Consejo General de la Abogacía Española is drawing up a specific code of  
conduct for these platforms, on the basis of  which it will certify platforms that 
comply with ethical rules.132 And the Colegio de Abogados de Madrid will begin this year 
to organize a forum called Abogacía 4.0, to discuss the technological changes that are 
revolutionizing the sector.133 
As we can see, it appears that European professional associations share a 
common vision: despite the challenges posed by online platforms for lawyers - they 
have not been banned but regulated.
122 Réglement Intérieur National de la profession d’avocat, available at https://www.cnb.avocat.fr/fr/
reglement-interieur-national-de-la-profession-davocat-rin.  
123 “La fourniture par transmission électronique de prestations juridiques par un avocat suppose 
l’existence d’un service personnalisé au client” Article 19(1).
124 “Il lui appartient de s’assurer de l’identité et des caractéristiques de la personne à laquelle il répond, 
afin de respecter le secret professionnel, d’éviter le conflit d’intérêts” Article 19(2).  
125 “L’avocat qui répond doit toujours être identifiable” Article 19(2).
126 “L’avocat qui fournit des prestations juridiques en ligne doit toujours être en mesure d’entrer 
personnellement et directement en relation avec l’internaute” Article 19(3). 
127 “L’avocat inscrit sur un site Internet ou une plateforme en ligne de référencement ou de mise en 
relation peut être amené à participer de façon forfaitaire aux frais de fonctionnement de ce site ou de 
cette plateforme, à l’exclusion de toute rémunération établie en fonction des honoraires que l’avocat 
perçoit des clients avec lesquels le site ou la plateforme l’a mis en relation”.  
128 See https://www.cnb.avocat.fr/fr/actualites/la-plateforme-de-consultation-avocatfr-fete-son-premier-
anniversaire-et-ses-bons-resultats.  
129 See http://avocat.fr/annuaire-des-avocats-de-france.  
130 “Our regulation is based on the outcomes that firms achieve, not on the tools that firms use to 
meet them. The duty of  confidentiality, for instance, applies to an email just as it applies to a letter or 
conversation” in https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/technology-legal-services.page. 
131 See Nederlandse orde van advocaten, Code of  Conduct 2018, available at  https://www.
advocatenorde.nl/document/nova-code-of-conduct-gedragsregels-2018.
132 “El CGAE trabaja en ese sentido. «Estamos trabajando en un código de conducta y, quien se 
adhiera, contará con un sello de cumplimiento que aportará confianza en sus servicios»”, in Del Rosal, 
“La ‘uberización’ llega al mundo del Derecho”. 
133 See https://www.abogacia.es/2018/11/20/nace-abogacia-4-0-el-nuevo-foro-tecnologico-del-icam/. 
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III. Autoridade da Concorrência’s project for legislative and 
regulatory reform in liberal professions
The recent proposal by the Autoridade da Concorrência for legislative and regulatory 
reform for the liberal professions134 addresses some of  the concerns raised in this 
paper.
This national competition authority proposes a new structure for professional 
associations, with a change in the paradigm of  self-regulation seeming to be desired, 
with the separation of  the regulatory function from the representative function. 
The proposal recommends changes to the governing bodies of  associations - which 
would now be supervised by an independent body constituted by representatives of  
the profession but also academics, representatives of  consumer organizations and 
individuals from other regulatory bodies.135  
With such a constitution, it could be argued that this supervisory board would be 
composed of  “independent experts”, and therefore the obligations imposed by competition 
law (European or national) would not apply to decisions issued by this body. 
According to the jurisprudence of  the ECJ, the fact that the governing body of  an 
association is mainly composed of  individuals who are independent of  the interests of  
the undertakings they regulate, implies that its decisions “cannot be regarded as agreements 
between traders”.136
The proposal explicitly mentions that this amendment intends to mitigate the 
conflict of  interest inherent in the system of  self-regulation.137 Thus, the AdC seems to 
be following the idea articulated by the Advocate General Jacobs,138 that in the case of  
governing bodies who are exclusively constituted by members of  the profession, it can be 
presumed that they take greater account of  their own interests, than the public interest.




135 Autoridade da Concorrência, Plano de Ação da AdC para a Reforma Legislativa e Regulatória, page 
28. “Propõe-se que o legislador altere o quadro legislativo e regulatório separando a função regulatória 
da função representativa na Ordem Profissional. Tal separação envolverá a criação de um órgão 
independente, que poderá ser externo à Ordem Profissional e por setor de atividade, ou poderá ser 
criado um órgão dentro da atual Ordem Profissional, efetivamente separado dos restantes órgãos da 
Ordem Profissional. O órgão independente assumiria a principal regulamentação da profissão, como 
matérias que dizem respeito ao acesso à profissão. A direção do órgão regulador seria composta por 
representantes da própria profissão e de outras pessoas, incluindo indivíduos de alto perfil de outros 
órgãos reguladores ou organizações, representantes de organizações de consumidores e académicos”.
136 Judgment of  the Court of  19 February 2002. Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, 
third parties: Diego Dessi, Giovanni Bertolotto and Compagnia Assicuratrice RAS SpA. Case 
C-35/99. ECLI:EU:C:2002:97, para. 36 and 37. Also Judgment of  the Court of  17 November 1993. 
Bundesanstalt für den Güterfernverkehr v Gebrüder Reiff  GmbH & Co. KG. Case C-185/91. 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:886. Para. 16 to 20. And Judgment of  the Court (Second Chamber) of  17 October 1995. 
DIP SpA v Comune di Bassano del Grappa, LIDL Italia Srl v Comune di Chioggia and Lingral Srl v Comune 
di Chiogga. Joined cases C-140/94, C-141/94 and C-142/94. ECLI:EU:C:1995:330. Para. 18 and 19.
137 Autoridade da Concorrência, Plano de Ação da AdC para a Reforma Legislativa, page 28: “Contudo, 
a mesma situação pode levar à adoção de medidas legislativas e autorregulatórias que, acima de tudo, 
pretendam salvaguardar os próprios interesses dos advogados, em detrimento do interesse público, 
podendo, inclusive, ser restritivas da concorrência”.
138 “[I]t can be presumed that private economic actors normally act in their own and not in the public 
interest when they conclude agreements between themselves.” See AG Jacobs.  Cases C-67/96 etc., 
Albany/Brentjens’/Drijvende Bokken, [1999], para. 184.
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On the other hand, this legislative project mentions the reduction of, “exclusive acts, 
ensuring criteria of  necessity, appropriateness and proportionality with public policy objectives”139 with 
the goal of  bringing “more innovation and diversity and more competitive prices, for the benefit of  
consumers”.140 
This measure seems to embrace the idea of  the “proportionality test”, put forward 
by the European Commission141 as well as OECD’s view that the monopoly on legal 
services could constitute an obstacle to innovation,142 thus, the reserved legal services 
stipulated by Lei No. 49/2004 would be altered. 
Finally, the AdC also intends on abolishing the prohibition of  multidisciplinary 
practice in professional societies,143 a legislative amendment that would allow for the 
emergence of  legaltechs in Portugal.
In general, this project poses challenges to the current constitutional framework 
but may also represent an opportunity to pave the way for the emergence of  new 
knowledge-based industries.
IV. Conclusion
The current legal framework seems to be based on the traditional paradigm of  
legal services: provided mostly by lawyers, who make themselves known only through 
“word of  mouth” and who practice their profession without partnering with colleagues 
from other areas.
While we are witnessing the emergence of  new technological legal services in 
countries such as Brazil, France, Germany, Spain and the UK – that enable consumers 
to access justice more easily –, it seems that Portugal is still clinging to traditional 
practices, and it is being left out of  this digital revolution.
There is a need to reform the current legal framework, so that it allows for the use 
of  new technologies in the legal sector, while also protecting consumers.
The monopoly on legal services should be reconsidered, since, “there is no scope 
for using digital applications (such as artificial intelligence) systems or providing legal advice through 
online or digital systems (…) the entity that would make an algorithm as a legal research tool for 
obtaining legal advice commercially available, would be practicing a reserved act illegally, unless he were 
a lawyer”.144
The prohibition on multi-disciplinary firms should also be reconsidered, to allow 
for the existence of  partnerships between lawyers and IT professionals, as is the case 
with companies such as rocketlawyer.com or captaincontract.com.
139 Autoridade da Concorrência, Plano de Ação da AdC para a Reforma Legislativa, page 29, “Em 
regra, a reserva de atividades deve ser reduzida, em respeito por critérios de necessidade, adequação 
e proporcionalidade com vista ao cumprimento dos objetivos da regulamentação profissional em 
causa”.
140 Autoridade da Concorrência, Plano de Ação da AdC para a Reforma Legislativa, page 29, “Esta 
abertura poderá conduzir a maior inovação e diversidade e preços mais competitivos pela prestação 
de diferentes serviços jurídicos, em benefício dos clientes, sejam eles famílias e empresas ou outros”.
141 European Commission, Report on Competition in Professional Services. 
142 OECD, OECD Competition Assessment Reviews: Portugal, 204.
143 Autoridade da Concorrência, Plano de Ação da AdC para a Reforma Legislativa, 32. “Propõe-se 
que o legislador elimine as normas que restringem, total ou parcialmente, a detenção da propriedade 
de sociedades de profissionais, permitindo que a detenção da totalidade ou da maioria desse capital 
social, bem como da maioria dos direitos de voto, possam ser detidos por indivíduos e entidades não 
profissionais e/ou não registados numa determinada Ordem Profissional”.
144 OECD, OECD Competition Assessment Reviews: Portugal, 88.
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On the other hand, there is a need to change the paradigm of  self-regulation 
through the introduction of  independent actors in the governing bodies of  
professional associations, so as to better safeguard the public interest.   
Professional associations should not be simple “associations of  undertakings”. They 
should take greater account of  the interests of  consumers. If  this is not the case, 
competition laws have to be enforced. As stated by US Federal Trade Commission, 
“active market participants cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets free from antitrust 
accountability”.145
Hopefully, the recent legislative project by the Autoridade da Concorrência could 
pave the way for a much-needed reform.
145 Geoffrey Green and Melissa Westman-Cherry, “Supreme Court: Self-interested boards must be 
actively supervised”, Bureau of  Competition, February 26 2015, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
blogs/competition-matters/2015/02/supreme-court-self-interested-boards-must-be-actively. 
